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Manufacturing Doubt
Abstract : In their efforts to affect regulations, firms have developed specific strategies
to exploit scientific uncertainty. They have manufactured doubt by hiring and funding
dissenting scientists, by producing and publicizing favorable scientific findings and by gen-
erally concealing their involvement in biased research. We propose a new model to study
the interplay between scientific uncertainty, firms’ miscommunication and public policies.
The government is benevolent but populist, and maximizes social welfare as perceived by
citizens. The industry can produce costly reports showing that its activity is not harm-
ful. Citizens are unaware of the industry’s miscommunication. We first characterize the
industry’s optimal miscommunication policy. The industry notably ceases miscommuni-
cating abruptly when scientists’ belief reaches a critical threshold. We identify a natural
condition under which miscommunication is stronger under a tax on emissions than un-
der command and control. We then analyze research funding. A populist government may
support research to enable firms to falsely reassure citizens. Establishing an independent
research agency helps limit the welfare losses induced by populist policies.
Keywords : Environmental Policy Instruments; Populist Policies; Research Funding; Sci-
entific Uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
Many important government regulations have to be adopted under significant scientific un-
certainty. In their efforts to affect regulations, firms have developed specific strategies to
exploit this uncertainty. For instance, tobacco producers vigorously denied the adverse ef-
fects of active smoking in the 1950s and 1960s and of second-hand smoke exposure from the
1970s through the 1990s (Bero, 2013).1 They spent large amounts of money on hiring and
funding dissenting scientists, generating and publicizing favorable scientific findings, and
shaping the public’s perceptions through large-scale communication campaigns (Proctor,
2011). Throughout this time, the industry tried hard to conceal its involvement in biased
research (Bero, 2013, p.157-158). The extent of this involvement only became known after
the forced release of confidential corporate documents, as part of the 1998 tobacco mas-
ter settlement agreement.2 On climate change, special interest groups have long exploited
scientific uncertainties to promote inaction (Hoggan & Littlemore, 2009). Communication
strategies outlined in a leaked 1998 memo by the American Petroleum Institute are re-
markably similar to those documented for tobacco (Cushman, 1998; and Walker, 1998).
Objectives included “Identifying and establishing cooperative relationships with all major
scientists whose research in this field supports our position” and “Providing grants for
advocacy on climate science, as deemed appropriate.” Oreskes & Conway (2010) docu-
ment how, as announced in this memo, a handful of scientists were coopted by industrial
lobbies. Concealing their industry ties and exploiting their scientific stature, they played
an effective role in science-denying communication campaigns. On tobacco and climate
change, firms have deliberately manufactured doubt in order to avoid, weaken or postpone
regulations. These unscrupulous practices likely yield first-order welfare losses.3 Economic
analysis of this subject is still underdeveloped , however, and our analysis aims to fill this
gap.
1For instance, a 1978 report prepared for the Tobacco Institute states that “The strategic and long-run
antidote to the passive smoking issue is, as we see it, developing and widely publicizing clear-cut, credible
medical reports that passive smoking is not harmful to the non-smoker’s health.” see Bero (2013, p.154).
2These documents can be consulted at https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/.
3Proctor (2011) argues that early doubt manufactured by the tobacco industry on the link between
smoking and cancer caused an excess 8000 billion smoked cigarettes and 8 million premature deaths.
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In this paper, we propose a new model to study the interplay between scientific un-
certainty, firms’ miscommunication and public policies. We assume that firms’ economic
activity generates uncertain damage, and that this uncertainty can be reduced through
scientific research. Firms can miscommunicate by producing favorable reports that resem-
ble independent scientific evidence. Citizens are unaware of firms’ miscommunication and
do not distinguish between industry-generated information and scientific knowledge. The
government is benevolent but populist: it maximizes social welfare as perceived by citizens.
It regulates firms’ activity either by imposing a maximal level of emissions or through a
tax on emissions.
We analyze a sequential game with the following timing. First, either the government
or an independent research agency decides how much research to finance. Scientists then
run experiments and form their belief. Second, the industry miscommunicates. Scientific
knowledge and the industry’s communication determine the citizens’ belief. Third, the
government regulates firms’ activity. We develop our analysis in two stages. For a given
scientific belief, we characterize the industry’s optimal miscommunication and its impact on
citizens’ beliefs, regulations and welfare. We study how these outcomes depend on the type
of environmental regulation implemented. We then analyze how firms’ miscommunication
affects research funding under different institutions.
Our analysis yields novel insights. We first show that the industry’s miscommunication
effort is a non-monotonic and discontinuous function of scientific belief. As scientists be-
come increasingly convinced that the activity is harmful, the industry first devotes more
and more resources to falsely reassuring the citizens. This yields increasingly large welfare
losses. When scientists’ belief reaches a critical threshold, however, countering the scien-
tific consensus becomes too costly and the industry abruptly ceases its miscommunication.
This qualitative pattern is robust to the type of instrument used (command and control
or tax on emissions).
This result sheds light on some documented tendencies. It is consistent with the large
time lags typically observed between when scientists reach a consensus on the need for
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regulation and when an effective public policy is implemented.4 It can help explain people’s
persistent underestimation of the scientific consensus on climate change (Ding et al., 2011).
Our finding helps explain sudden reversals in the official positions of special interest groups,
as observed in the past on tobacco and recently on climate change. It also helps explain
episodes of abrupt awakening to the dangers posed by some industrial activity.
We then look at the impact of the type of environmental regulation implemented. We
identify a natural condition that leads to more industry miscommunication under a tax
on emissions than under command and control. Since the industry’s payoff is lower under
a tax on emissions, due to the added fiscal burden relative to command and control, the
industry has more to gain from influencing public opinion and regulation.
Next, we show that the wedge driven by the industry between scientists’ and citizens’
beliefs has important implications for research funding. We analyze different institutions’
incentives to support research. Since a populist government cares about perceived welfare,
its utility increases when citizens are falsely reassured. This may lead to a partial alignment
of interests between the government and the industry. We find that a populist government
may support research to allow the industry to miscommunicate more effectively. We show
that a partial answer to this problem is to establish an independent funding agency, not
unlike the current National Science Foundation and European Research Council. Interest-
ingly, the independent agency may decide to provide more or less research funding than
under the first-best. Either strategy may provide the best way to limit the damaging
effects of firms’ miscommunication. Our analysis thus provides a new rationale for the
establishment of independent scientific agencies.
A key assumption is that citizens are unaware of the industry’s involvement in biased
research. This assumption is consistent with evidence of dissimulation of negative scientific
findings by the tobacco industry and with the documented tendency of industry-funded
scientists to conceal their funding sources (Bero, 2013; Proctor, 2011). The many scandals
in the medical sector brought to light this concealment, leading to the adoption of disclosure
4See European Environment Agency (2013), which notably shows that ‘false positives’, where preventive
actions undertaken due to early scientific warnings turn out to be unnecessary, are much less frequent than
‘false negatives’, where no action is taken despite early warnings that are confirmed ex-post.
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rules by academic journals. These rules do not appear to be very effective, however, and
corporate-funded ghostwriting is still suspected of being a major problem in biomedical
research (Bero, Glantz & Hong, 2005; PLoS Medicine Editors, 2009; Thacker, 2014).5 This
may help explain why citizens hold incorrect beliefs on many important issues (Flynn,
Nyhan & Reifler, 2016).
Our analysis contributes to several literatures. It first advances understanding of the
political economy of scientific uncertainty. It contributes to a growing literature on indi-
rect lobbying, where special interest groups try to affect voters’ beliefs, see e.g. Laussel &
van Ypersele (2012), and Petrova (2012). In Yu (2005), an industrial and an environmen-
tal lobby compete for political influence directly and through communication campaigns.
However, scientific progress plays no role in his analysis. Baron (2005) and Shapiro (2016)
model competition between special interests to seek political influence through the news
media. They adopt a coarse representation of science where evidence is either uninforma-
tive or fully informative. By contrast, we consider a single lobby and voters who are not
aware of the lobby’s miscommunication.6 We adopt a rich representation of science where
evidence can accumulate and bring scientists progressively closer to the truth. This allows
us to analyze how firms’ miscommunication depends on the level of scientific uncertainty
and how, in turn, this miscommunication affects research funding.
Second, our paper contributes to a literature studying the implications of the fact
that citizens often hold incorrect beliefs. Researchers have long debated the normative
consequences of citizens’ misperceptions: should a benevolent government respect citizens’
incorrect beliefs and assuage fears? Or should it use scarce resources where they are really
needed, for instance, to save lives?7 Salanié & Treich (2009) analyze optimal regulations
for two types of governments, and we adopt some of their terminology. In this literature,
citizens’ and experts’ beliefs are typically taken as given. By contrast, these beliefs are
formed endogenously in our framework, and are affected by scientific progress and by
5Relatedly, Monsanto has recently been accused of ghostwriting scientific articles vouching for the safety
of its Roundup herbicide, see Waldman, Stecker & Rosenblatt (2017).
6Some studies consider Bayesian voters who are fully aware of the lobbies’ actions, see Baron (2005)
and Stone (2011). However, their results and insights may not carry over to an economy with effective
concealment and systematic misperceptions.
7See, in particular, Pollak (1998), Portney (1992), and Viscusi & Hamilton (1999).
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industry miscommunication. This raises new questions, such as how misperceptions depend
on the economy’s fundamentals and the determination of scientific policies.
Third, a large and growing literature explores the effect of uncertainty on environmen-
tal outcomes. Most studies in this literature consider a benevolent social planner with no
misperception.8 Recently, researchers have started to study uncertainty in strategic con-
texts, such as free-riding between countries.9 Here, we focus on a new channel through
which uncertainty may affect the environment: citizens’ misperceptions induced by firms’
miscommunication in the presence of scientific uncertainty. We provide a systematic anal-
ysis of this channel and show that it may have a first-order impact on environmental and
scientific outcomes.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the choice of environmental policy
instruments. We show that a tax on emissions (or a market for permits with permits
auctioned) may lead to more miscommunication than command and control (or a market
for permits with permits freely allocated).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. We
develop models of scientific progress and of belief formation, and characterize the industry’s
optimal miscommunication in Section 3. The level of research is endogenized in Section 4.
We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
We consider a society composed of four groups of agents: firms, scientists, citizens and the
government. The firms’ economic activity generates pollution, which may be harmful to
health and to the environment. The government has to decide on the degree of regulation
of this pollution. The impacts of the pollution and the extent of harm it might cause are
uncertain. Scientists can do research to reduce this uncertainty. Both firms and scientists
communicate about the economic activity’s impacts. Citizens then form beliefs about these
8See, e.g., Gollier, Jullien & Treich (2000), Heal & Kriström (2002), Weitzman (2009) and studies based
on integrated assessment models like Nordhaus (1994) and Stern (2007).
9As in Baker (2005), Boucher & Bramoullé (2010), Bramoullé & Treich (2009), Finus & Pintassilgo
(2013) and Ulph (2004).
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effects, and the government considers public opinion when adopting regulations.
Formally, firms’ benefits from emitting emissions e are equal to B(e) = be0e− 12be
2 with
b, e0 > 0.
10 In the absence of regulation, benefits are maximized by emitting e = e0, the
“business as usual” level of pollution. The government regulates emissions, and can do so in
different ways. Let e∗ ≤ e0 be the target level of regulated emissions. Under command and
control, the government directly imposes this maximal level. Alternatively, the government
can tax emissions at rate t. Firms choose emissions to maximize B(e) − te, which yields
B′(e) = t. The government then sets t = B′(e∗) = b(e0 − e∗). Firms’ payoffs are equal to
B(e∗) = be0e
∗ − 1
2
b(e∗)2 under command and control and to B(e∗) − te∗ = 1
2
b(e∗)2 under
a tax on emissions. In either case, firms’ payoffs decrease as e∗ decreases, giving them an
incentive to be as little regulated as possible.11
Emissions may generate damage. For simplicity, we assume that scientific uncertainty
takes a binary form. Either pollution is indeed harmful, and overall damage is equal to
D(e) = d0e +
1
2
de2 with d0, d ≥ 0. We further assume that d0 < be0. The marginal benefit
from the first unit of emission exceeds its marginal damage. Or pollution is not harmful.
Scientists believe that pollution is harmful with probability p. The expected social welfare
is thus equal to:12
W (p, e) = B(e)− pD(e).
Say that a government is technocratic when it maximizes social welfare computed with
up-to-date scientific knowledge. A technocratic government sets the emissions level to
optimally balance social benefits and social costs. This means that B′(e) = pD′(e), which
10Quadratic functional forms have been widely used in environmental economics (e.g. Nordhaus, 2015).
They allow researchers to maintain tractability while capturing key economic features, such as the property
that marginal abatement cost is increasing in abatement.
11The government could also regulate emissions through tradeable permits. Let r be the price on the
market for permits. If permits are initially auctioned, firms’ payoffs are equal to B(e)− re. If permits are
initially freely allocated, firms’ payoffs are equal to B(e) − re + re∗. In either case, this yields B′(e) = r
and hence r = B′(e∗) = t. Firms’ payoffs under command and control and under freely allocated permits
are then equal. They are also equal under a tax on emissions and under auctioned permits.
12Under a tax on emissions, we assume that tax revenues are redistributed in a lump-sum manner to
citizens. Citizens’ utility is then equal to te− pD(e) and overall welfare is equal to B(e)− pD(e), as under
command and control.
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yields:
e(p) =
be0 − pd0
b+ pd
. (1)
This corresponds to the first-best outcome, which can be equivalently reached through
command and control or through a tax on emissions. Note that e is decreasing and convex
in scientific belief p.13
Citizens’ beliefs may differ from scientists’ beliefs. Firms are organized in a communi-
cation lobby, which tries to affect public opinion on the effects of pollution.14,15 Citizens’
beliefs, q, then depend both on scientific beliefs and on the industry’s miscommunication
effort. Say that a government is populist when it maximizes social welfare as perceived by
citizens: W (q, e) = B(e)− qD(e). The level of regulation chosen by a populist government
is then equal to e(q). When citizens are less worried about the impacts of pollution than
scientists, q < p and e(q) > e(p). A populist government then underregulates with respect
to the first-best. This provides incentives for the industry to try to falsely reassure citizens
on the effects of its activity.
We assume that the government is populist in Section 3. We consider an exogenous
level of research and characterize the industry’s optimal communication policy. In Section
4, we endogenize the level of research under various institutional arrangements.
3 Exogenous Science
In this section, we consider an exogenous level of research. We first develop a simple
Bayesian model of scientific progress. We then build on it to model industry miscommu-
nication and opinion formation. Finally, we characterize the industry’s optimal commu-
13The assumption that be0 > d0 guarantees that e(p) > 0. By contrast if be0 ≤ d0, e(p) = 0 if
p ≥ be0/d0. This introduces a kink in the optimal regulation, which complicates the analysis without
affecting the insights obtained.
14For instance, in 1954 US tobacco companies formed the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, which
later became the Council for Tobacco Research. “The industry stated publicly that it was forming the
TIRC to fund independent scientific research to determine whether there was a link between smoking and
lung cancer. However, internal documents from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company have shown that
the TIRC was actually formed for public relations purposes, to convince the public that the hazards of
smoking had not been proven.”, see Bero (2013, p.156).
15We abstract away from issues of formation and stability of the communication lobby and, more gen-
erally, from strategic interactions between firms in the industry.
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nication policy. We contrast outcomes under command and control and under a tax on
emissions.
3.1 Scientific and popular beliefs
Consider the following model of scientific progress. Scientists can do research to reduce their
uncertainty on the effects of pollution. They have prior beliefs p0 that pollution is harmful.
They may run n experiments to learn about pollution’s impact. Each experiment provides
a noisy signal on the true state of the world, and there is a probability 1
2
< P < 1 of its
findings being correct. Denote by k the number of experiments indicating that pollution
is harmful. Applying Bayes’ rule, we see that scientists’ ex-post belief is equal to
p =
p0
(
n
k
)
P k(1− P )n−k
p0
(
n
k
)
P k(1− P )n−k + (1− p0)
(
n
k
)
P n−k(1− P )k
.
Let α = P/(1− P ) > 1 denote the relative accuracy of experimental findings. This yields:
p(p0, k, n) =
p0α
k
p0αk + (1− p0)αn−k
. (2)
Note that p ≥ p0 ⇔ k ≥ n/2. More generally, this formula embodies key features of
Bayesian updating. For instance, if experiments are run in several stages the final belief
does not depend on their ordering. Formally, p(p(p0, k1, n1), k2, n2) = p(p0, k1 +k2, n1 +n2)
for any k1 ≤ n1 and k2 ≤ n2.
Thus, scientists’ belief is a discrete stochastic variable p̃, such that p̃ = p(p0, k, n) with
probability p0
(
n
k
)
P k(1− P )n−k + (1− p0)
(
n
k
)
P n−k(1− P )k for any integer k between 0 and
n. We can check that the expectation of scientists’ belief is equal to their prior: for any n,
E(p̃) = p0. As n increases, p̃ puts more and more probability mass on beliefs farther and
farther away from p0. As n→∞, we show in the Appendix that p̃ converges in probability
towards the distribution p∞ = 0 with probability 1 − p0 and 1 with probability p0. As
the number of experiments becomes arbitrarily large, scientific knowledge converges to the
truth.
Citizens’ beliefs may differ from scientists’ beliefs. At cost c, the industry can produce
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a report indicating that pollution is not harmful. Citizens are unaware of the industry’s
miscommunication and treat the information produced by the industry as independent
scientific evidence.16,17 Under this assumption, the citizens’ belief is equal to
q =
p0α
k
p0αk + (1− p0)αn−k+m
where m denotes the industry’s communication effort, i.e. the number of reports it has pro-
duced. In fact, q can be expressed as a function of scientists’ belief p and of communication
effort m:18
q(p,m) =
p
p+ (1− p)αm
. (3)
We assume in what follows that m can take continuous values, m ∈ R+. This helps
simplify computations and the expressions for the main results without affecting our main
insights.
We next clarify how the citizens’ belief varies with p and m. We compute q’s various
derivatives in the Appendix. We see, first, that ∂q/∂p > 0 and ∂2q/∂p2 > 0. The marginal
impact of scientists’ belief on citizens’ belief is positive and increasing. Then, observe
that ∂q/∂m < 0: q is decreasing in m from q(p, 0) = p to q(p,∞) = 0. Interestingly, its
curvature may vary: ∂2q/∂m2 < 0 if q > 1
2
and ∂2q/∂m2 > 0 if q < 1
2
. Two cases emerge.
Suppose first that p ≤ 1
2
. Then, q is convex in m. In that case, the marginal impact of
industry’s miscommunication on citizens’ belief is decreasing in absolute value. By contrast
if p ≥ 1
2
, q is first concave in m for q ≥ 1
2
, which happens for m ≤ ln(p/(1− p))/ ln(α), and
convex when m ≥ ln(p/(1 − p))/ ln(α) and q ≤ 1
2
. Therefore, when scientists think that
pollution is likely to be harmful, miscommunication initially has an increasing marginal
impact, in absolute value, on citizens’ belief. These increasing returns capture a well-
16By contrast, we assume that the government and the research agency are aware of the industry’s
miscommunication.
17Miscommunication costs are not included in the welfare computations. Proposition 1 below is robust
to including them. Numerical simulations indicate that welfare effects may be further amplified when
accounting for these costs.
18In the absence of miscommunication, citizens’ belief is equal to scientists’ belief. Thus, we abstract
away from frictions and costs in knowledge dissemination and from the role played by various media (TV,
press, internet) in this process. We discuss these issues further in the Conclusion.
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known property of Bayesian updating: extra information has the largest effect when the
agent is most uncertain. In addition, the impact of extra information decreases as the
agent becomes more certain. We will see below that this feature plays an important role
in determining the optimal communication policy.
3.2 Firms’ optimal communication
We now derive our first main result. We characterize the industry’s optimal communica-
tion policy, uncovering three domains. When p is low and scientists believe that pollution
is unlikely to be harmful, the benefits from miscommunication are too low and the indus-
try does not try to change the citizens’ beliefs. When p takes intermediate values, and
scientists are more uncertain about the effects of the pollution, the industry engages in
miscommunication and targets a specific level of citizens’ belief. As p increases, the target
is unchanged and communication efforts first increase continuously. When p reaches a crit-
ical threshold, the costs of miscommunication become too high and the industry abruptly
ceases its efforts. Optimal miscommunication is therefore non-monotonic and discontinuous
in scientists’ belief.
Formally, the industry’s objective is to maximize its payoff with respect to m:
πc(m) = be0e(q(p,m))− 12be(q(p,m))
2 − cm under command and control and
πt(m) =
1
2
be(q(p,m))2 − cm under a tax on emissions. We provide an in-depth analysis
of these payoff functions in the Appendix. Let m∗c (m
∗
t ) be a solution to the problem of
maximizing πc (πt) over [0,+∞[.
Theorem 1 Under command and control, there exists c̄c > 0 such that if c ≥ c̄c, then
m∗c = 0. If c < c̄c, there exist a target popular belief q
∗
c and a threshold scientific belief
p∗c > q
∗
c such that m
∗
c = 0 if p ≤ q∗c or p ≥ p∗c. If q∗c ≤ p ≤ p∗c, then q(m∗c , p) = q∗c and
m∗c =
1
ln(α)
[
ln(
p
1− p
)− ln( q
∗
c
1− q∗c
)
]
.
Miscommunication under a tax on emissions has a similar shape, with thresholds c̄t, q
∗
t and
p∗t .
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We provide a sketch of the proof here. See the Appendix for details and for characteri-
zations of the threshold values c̄c, q
∗
c , p
∗
c and c̄t, q
∗
t , p
∗
t .
19 We start by examining the second
derivatives of the payoff function. Two cases emerge. On the one hand, if p is low enough,
πc is concave everywhere. Since the payoff becomes negative when m is large enough, the
solution is then obtained by analyzing the sign of ∂πc/∂m(0). We show that ∂πc/∂m(0) < 0
if p < q∗c , which implies that m
∗
c = 0 in that case. In contrast, ∂πc/∂m(0) > 0 if p > q
∗
c
and m∗c then solves ∂πc/∂m(m
∗
c) = 0. We can express ∂πc/∂m as a function of q, and this
equation then defines the target belief q∗c . On the other hand, if p is high enough, πc is first
convex and then concave. When p is high, the industry’s payoff first displays increasing
returns on communication effort. We show that in this case, the solution is either to reach
the target q∗c or to set m
∗
c = 0. We compare the payoffs obtained from these two actions and
show that there exists a critical threshold p∗c above which q
∗
c leads to less payoff than no
communication.20 This discontinuity in the solution is induced by the presence of convex-
ities in payoffs. We then analyze properties of πt, firms’ payoff under a tax on emissions.
We show that it displays similar qualitative features and leads to a solution with a similar
shape.
We next analyze how the type of environmental regulation affects firms’ miscommuni-
cation.
Theorem 2 Suppose that be0 ≥ 2d0 + de0. Then, m∗t ≥ m∗c with a strict inequality if
m∗t > 0.
This result means that if marginal damages at zero are not too high, firms always
miscommunicate more under a tax on emissions than under command and control. This
notably implies that c̄c < c̄t and if c < min(c̄c, c̄t), q
∗
t < q
∗
c < p
∗
c < p
∗
t . Observe that
with both instruments, firms obtain lower profits because of the lower level of emissions:
B(e) < B(e0). Under a tax on emissions, firms face an additional fiscal burden and see
19For clarity, we sometimes omit subscripts in what follows. We may for instance write q∗ when the
argument applies both to q∗c and q
∗
t .
20At p = p∗c , the industry is indifferent between playing m
∗
c = 0 or reaching q
∗
c . The problem of
maximizing πc has two solutions.
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their profits further reduced by the amount of the tax paid to the government. This gives
them an extra incentive to influence regulation relative to command and control.21
We illustrate Theorems 1 and 2 in Figure 1. Parameter values are set as follows:
d0 = 9.9, d = 0.01, e0 = 10, b = 2, c = 4.3, and P = 0.64. From our characterizations in
the Appendix, we compute the thresholds: c̄c ≈ 4.31, q∗c ≈ 0.21, p∗c ≈ 0.99 and c̄t ≈ 11.27,
q∗t ≈ 0.08, p∗t ≈ 0.99.
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Figure 1: Firms’ miscommunication and citizens’ beliefs under tax on emissions (Solid line)
and under command and control (Dotted line).
Here, the costs of miscommunication are quite low compared to the benefits, and effort
is positive over a large range of scientific beliefs, under both types of regulation. We depict
in Figure 1 how m∗, in the Left panel, and q(m∗, p), in the Right panel, vary with p under
21The condition be0 ≥ 2d0 + de0 guarantees that e(p) ≥ (d0 + de0)/(b + d) and the first-best level of
emissions is bounded from below. When this condition is not satisfied, emissions can get arbitrarily close to
zero. The fiscal burden also gets arbitrarily close to zero and miscommunication incentives may be higher
under command and control in some situations.
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a tax on emissions and under command and control. Note that citizens’ belief also varies
discontinuously with p. It stays at the target level q∗ as long as the industry engages in
miscommunication and then jumps back to p when the industry ceases to miscommunicate.
The combination of citizens’ industry-induced misperceptions and of populist policies
can lead to significant welfare losses. Note that W (p, e(q))−W (p, e(p)) = −1
2
(b+pd)[e(p)−
e(q)]2 < 0. This loss increases in absolute value as q decreases and moves farther away from
p. In Figure 2, we depict the ratio of the level of welfare under the populist policy over
the first-best level of welfare (technocratic policy), W (p, e(q))/W (p, e(p)), for the same
parameter values as in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Welfare loss induced by firms’ miscommunication under tax on emissions (Solid
line) and under command and control (Dotted line).
We see that relative welfare loss first increases as scientific belief, and hence firms’
miscommunication and the induced distortion in citizens’ belief, increases. When scientific
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belief becomes high enough, however, the industry stops miscommunicating and welfare
jumps back to its first-best value. In addition, welfare losses are larger under a tax on
emissions, due to the increased miscommunication.
From our characterization of firms’ communication policy, we can further derive some
potentially interesting comparative statics. Consider, for instance, the impact of the ac-
curacy of experimental findings under command and control. An increase in α has two
countervailing effects. On the one hand, scientists converge more quickly towards the truth
when α is higher. The variance in scientific beliefs tends to be higher when α is higher
and, in the absence of industry miscommunication, this applies to citizens’ beliefs as well.
On the other hand, we see that c̄c is increasing in α and we show in the Appendix that
q∗c is decreasing while p
∗
c is increasing in α. Because citizens do not differentiate between
information provided by the industry and by scientists, a higher α makes the industry’s
miscommunication more effective.22 Industry miscommunication thus emerges for higher
values of communication costs and over a larger range of scientific beliefs. This runs counter
to the first effect and tends to slow down the convergence of citizens’ beliefs towards the
truth.23
4 Endogenous Science
In this section, we analyze the level of research chosen in three different setups: when
the government is technocratic; when the government is populist and decides on both
research funding and environmental regulation; and when the government is populist but
research funding is decided by an independent agency. Throughout the section, we analyze
a sequential game with three steps. (1) First, the institution setting the research policy
decides how many experiments n to finance. These experiments are then run and scientists
form their belief p. (2) Second, the industry observes scientific belief and chooses a level of
22Similarly, the amount of communication needed to reach a fixed target of popular belief is lower when
α is higher.
23This negative impact of experimental accuracy is reminiscent of findings in Edmond (2013). In a context
of information manipulation and political regime change, the accuracy of signals received by citizens may
actually help autocratic regimes stay in power.
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miscommunication effort m. Citizens then form their belief q. (3) Third, the government
regulates the industry’s activity. Finally, benefits and costs are realized.
As in Stackelberg competition, the institution deciding scientific research funding takes
its decision before the industry miscommunicates. We analyze the subgame perfect equi-
libria of this sequential game through backwards induction. (2) Conditional on scientists’
realized belief p, the industry chooses its optimal level of miscommunication as described
in Theorem 1. (1) The government or the research agency chooses the level of scientific
research funding, rationally anticipating the industry’s subsequent miscommunication.
4.1 Welfare
We first determine the welfare ranking of these three institutional arrangements. Recall,
W (p, e) = B(e)−pD(e) denotes welfare computed once research is done but before the state
of the world is revealed. We now consider expected welfare computed ex-ante, before the
results from research are known. Assume that each experiment costs C.24 A technocratic
government chooses the level of research funding by maximizing expected welfare:
Wtech(n) = E[W (p̃, e(p̃))|n]− Cn
and let W ∗tech denote its maximal value.
By contrast, a populist government maximizes expected perceived welfare, computed
with potentially false popular beliefs:
Πpop(n) = E[W (q̃, e(q̃))|n]− Cn
In general, Πpop(n) differs from the expected welfare computed with unbiased scientific
belief E[W (p̃, e(q̃))|n] − Cn. Denote by W ∗pop the expected welfare induced by a populist
choice of research funding level.25
24These costs may notably include opportunity costs of public funds. We introduce explicit budget
considerations in Section 5.
25Since q ≤ p, Πpop(n) ≥ E[W (p̃, e(q̃))|n] − Cn. Undue reassurance increases perceived welfare by
decreasing perceived expectations of future harm.
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Finally, consider an independent research agency deciding on the level of research fund-
ing before firms miscommunicate and the populist government regulates emissions. Assume
that this agency is benevolent and computes welfare based on up-to-date scientific knowl-
edge. It seeks to maximize
Windep(n) = E[W (p̃, e(q̃))|n]− Cn.
and let W ∗indep denote its maximal value.
We show next that welfare can be unambiguously ranked across the three institutions.
Proposition 1 W ∗pop ≤ W ∗indep ≤ W ∗tech.
To see why Proposition 1 holds, note first that W ∗tech corresponds to the first-best - and
hence highest - level of welfare attainable in the economy. Therefore, W ∗pop, W
∗
indep ≤ W ∗tech.
Then, observe that the independent agency maximizes welfare under populist environmen-
tal regulation. Therefore, W ∗indep is the highest level of welfare attainable when e = e(q),
which implies that W ∗indep ≥ W ∗pop. Populist policies thus entail welfare losses even when
research funding is endogenous. Moreover, these losses are partially offset when research
funding is controlled by a technocratic agency which is independent from the government.
4.2 Scientific policies
We now analyze the scientific policies adopted under the different institutions. The insti-
tutions’ optimization problems involve non-convexities and discrete jumps, and we could
not characterize scientific policies analytically. Our objective in this section is accordingly
more modest: to illustrate the variety of potential outcomes and to explore the main forces
at work.
Consider the technocratic benchmark first. The government anticipates that research
will change the ex-post distribution of scientific beliefs. Since W (p, e(p)) = B(e(p)) −
pD(e(p)) is convex in p,26 E[W (p̃, e(p̃)] is higher when the distribution of scientific beliefs
26By the envelope theorem, the first derivative is equal to −D(e(p)). The second derivative is then equal
to −e′(p)D′(e(p)) ≥ 0.
16
p̃ is more dispersed. Expected welfare gross of the costs of experiments is highest when
n =∞ and scientists have converged to the truth: p̃ = 0 with probability 1−p0 and 1 with
probability p0. As n increases, scientists get increasingly closer to the truth. Extensive
numerical simulations show that expected gross welfare generally increases at a decreasing
rate in n.27 In this case, the optimal level of research funding can be characterized by a
standard marginal condition. It should be set at the level where the marginal gain from
an additional experiment is approximately equal to its marginal cost C. To sum up, a
technocratic government trades the welfare benefits from uncertainty reduction against the
research costs. Note that this classic incentive also affects the decisions of a populist
government and an independent agency. These two institutions are, in addition, affected
by firms’ miscommunication.
Next, consider a populist government. A key new motive appears in its objective func-
tion. Observe that W (q, e(q)) increases when q decreases. Perceived welfare is decreasing
in actual citizens’ belief that emissions are harmful. A populist government would there-
fore like citizens to be falsely reassured. This is precisely what doubt manufacturing does,
and hence the interests of a populist government may be partly aligned with those of the
industry.28 Note, then, that doubt manufacturing only occurs when p̃ takes on moderate
values. From Theorem 1, we know that m∗ = 0 and q = p if p ≤ q∗ or p ≥ p∗ while
m∗ > 0 and q = q∗ if q∗ < p < p∗. A populist government may then choose an amount
of research ensuring that scientific belief likely takes on moderate values. This, in turn,
is partly determined by the position of the initial scientific belief p0 with respect to the
domain of effective miscommunication [q∗, p∗]. If p0 ∈ [q∗, p∗], public opinion is biased by
industry’s efforts even when there is very little research. Expected citizens’ belief E(q̃)
may then be increasing in n and a populist government may not want to support scientific
activities. By contrast, if p0 < q
∗ or p0 > p
∗, E(q̃) = p0 when n = 0. In that case E(q̃) is
27However, simulations also indicate that E[W (p̃, e(p̃)] may be non-monotonous and non-concave in n
in some circumstances. For instance, when p0 is close to 0 or 1 and α is close to 1, expected gross welfare
is often initially convex in n.
28In the long-run, belief distortion is of course untenable and reality must eventually assert itself. Due
to the electoral cycle, governments tend to have relatively short time horizons. They may well decide to
assuage citizens’ worries now, without caring about long-term consequences.
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typically non-monotonic in n, reaching a minimum for some positive value n. This level of
research allows the industry to most effectively miscommunicate in expectation, and hence
may be preferred by a populist government.
Finally, consider an independent research agency which anticipates the actions of the
industrial lobbies and their impact on environmental regulations. In contrast to a populist
government, this independent agency tries to counter the negative impact of the industry’s
miscommunication. This may lead the agency to provide more or less research funding than
a technocratic government.
We illustrate these effects in Figures 3 and 4. We depict in Figure 3 how scientific
policies set by the three institutions vary with initial belief p0, for the same parameters as
in Figure 1 and for C = 0.1.
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Figure 3: Research funding under three institutional arrangements. Command and control
(on the left) and tax on emissions (on the right).
The left bars in dark grey correspond to the first-best levels of funding, in the absence
of citizens’ misperceptions. Support for research first increases and then decreases as p0
increases. A technocratic government only cares about the direct benefits and costs of
reducing scientific uncertainty. These benefits are highest when uncertainty is strongest.
Here funding reaches a maximum at p0 = 0.5, and research is not funded when initial
scientific uncertainty is very low (p0 = 0.1) or very high (p0 = 0.9).
The middle bars in white depict the scientific policies chosen by a populist government.
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When scientists have initial suspicions that harm is not unlikely, the government provides
less funding for research than under the first-best. Too much research would decrease
perceived welfare by reducing the ability of firms to reassure citizens. By contrast, when
initial belief is low (p0 = 0.1 or 0.2 under command and control; p0 = 0.1 under a tax), the
populist government provides more support for research than in the first-best. Remember
that here q∗c ≈ 0.21 and q∗t ≈ 0.08. As n increases, a portion of the distribution of scientific
beliefs shifts to the right of p0, and may then fall into the miscommunication range. Firms
can thus better miscommunicate, in expectation, for some intermediate value of n. This
generates an extra incentive for a populist government to support research.
In addition, we see that populist support for research is stronger under command and
control than under a tax on emissions. The reason, paradoxically, is that the miscommuni-
cation range is smaller under command and control: [q∗c , p
∗
c ] ⊂ [q∗t , p∗t ]. Reaching this range,
and thus better reassuring citizens in expectations, therefore requires more research.
This intuition is confirmed by looking at the expected level of firms’ miscommunication,
E(m̃), and at the expected level of popular beliefs, E(q̃) in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Expected firm’s miscommunication and citizens’ belief under populist policy
(Dotted line) and agency policy (Solid line). Command and control (Above) and tax on
emissions (Below).
We see that under a populist government, firms increase their communication effort
continuously with scientists’ initial belief.29 This miscommunication is effective: citizens’
belief lies significantly below correct belief represented by the 45-degree line in the Right
panel.
Finally, the right bars in light grey in Figure 3 depict the scientific policies of an
independent funding agency. We see that the agency essentially tries to limit the welfare
losses induced by populist policies in two opposite ways. When initial beliefs are not too
low, the agency provides much more funding than under the first-best. This is a strategy
of scientific overkill : by doing lots of research, scientists necessarily get close to the truth
29If scientists are initially close enough to certainty, firms’ communication essentially disappears in
expectation. Thus, E(m̃) collapses when p0 gets close to 1.
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and firms then have little leeway to influence public opinion.30 The benefits from shutting
down firms’ miscommunication outweigh the added research costs when the likelihood that
the activity is harmful is not too low. In addition, scientific overkill starts for a lower
level of scientific belief and leads to more research under a tax on emissions than under
command and control. Because firms’ incentives to miscommunicate are stronger under a
tax on emissions, the agency must provide more research funding to counter firms’ efforts.
This is confirmed by looking at E(m̃) and E(q̃) in Figure 4. When p0 is not too high,
firms’ expected communication is much lower than under a populist government. Moreover,
E(m̃) stays more or less constant, leading to a widening gap in expected miscommunication
under the two regimes as p0 increases. Scientific overkill is effective at countering firms’
miscommunication. We see in the Right panel of Figure 4 that in this range, expected
citizens’ belief, while biased, closely follows the correct beliefs.
By contrast, when initial belief is low, the agency provides no funding. This is a strat-
egy of deliberate ignorance, since some research would yield lower welfare than no research.
Indeed, firms’ expected communication is generally lower than under a populist govern-
ment, which provides more funding in this range. Relatedly, citizens’ expected belief is less
biased.
5 Conclusion
We provide one of the first analyses of the interactions between scientific uncertainty, firms’
miscommunication and public policies. Characterizing firms’ optimal miscommunication,
we show that it can yield significant welfare losses and can have a strong impact on scientific
research funding. Moreover, miscommunication may be reduced by regulating through
command and control.
Our analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Relaxing them would pro-
vide potentially fruitful directions for future research. Since a populist government maxi-
mizes perceived welfare, firms do not have an incentive to engage in political lobbying here.
30That is, there is a low probability that scientists’ belief p ends up in the range [q∗, p∗] where firms
affect public opinion.
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Alternatively, the government could maximize a combination of welfare and transfers, as
in Grossman & Helpman (1994). Firms would then try to affect regulation both directly
through transfers and indirectly via public opinion, and exploring the interaction between
direct and indirect lobbying could be interesting. We suspect that Theorem 1 would ex-
tend and that the sharp drop in communication effort would be accompanied by a sharp
increase in political lobbying.31As in Yu (2005), it would also be natural to consider in-
teractions between an industrial and an environmental lobby. Competition to affect public
opinion would likely increase firms’ communication effort and could lead them to abandon
miscommunication for lower levels of scientific beliefs.
In our analysis, we assume that firms are organized in a communication lobby which
tries to maximize the industry’s payoff. In reality, firms within the industry may be tempted
to free-ride and to benefit from the lobby’s actions without paying their share of the com-
munication costs. Introducing strategic interactions between firms would be an interesting
direction for future research. We conjecture that these strategic interactions would gener-
ally reduce the effectiveness of the lobby and hence the extent of miscommunication.
Another assumption is that, in the absence of miscommunication, scientific knowledge
disseminates widely and with no additional cost to citizens. In reality, knowledge diffusion
may be imperfect and costly, and may depend on decisions by other agents such as journal-
ists and media owners (Shapiro 2016). More generally, misperceptions may have a variety
of causes, such as lack of Bayesian rationality.32 It would be interesting to introduce these
considerations in our framework. We suspect that miscommunication would be amplified
in some instances and reduced in others. If there is poor diffusion of scientific knowledge,
for instance, this likely reduces firms’ incentives to produce biased research.
Finally, we have focused our representation of science on the key question of under-
standing the level of harm induced by the economic activity. In reality, science of course
covers a wide variety of issues and questions. Another documented strategy of industrial
31In particular, this could shed new light on the debate on the regulation of political contributions. The
introduction of a limit to contributions, for instance, could lead to an increase in miscommunication and,
possibly, to a decrease in welfare. We thank Arnaud Dellis for drawing our attention to this implication.
32For example, agents may not properly account for the sources of the information they receive when
forming their beliefs, as explored in the literature on persuasion bias (DeMarzo, Vayanos & Zwiebel 2003)
and correlation neglect (Levy & Razin 2015).
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lobbies has been to fund “distraction research”, i.e., legitimate research that does not ad-
vance knowledge on this key question and distracts scientists and citizens’ attention away
from it.33 Analyzing this elaborate strategy would require developing a richer model of
science.
33See, in particular, chapter 16 in Proctor (2011).
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APPENDIX
Proofs of statements in Section 3.1 We first prove that p̃ converges in probability to
p∞ as n tends to ∞. Let us first consider even values of n. Introduce l = k − n/2 and
σ = P (1−P ). Since 1
2
< P < 1, σ < 1
4
. We have: p(p0, k, n) =
p0αl
p0αl+(1−p0)α−l = p̂(p0, l) with
probability xl,n =
(
n
l+n/2
)
σn/2(p0α
l+(1−p0)α−l) for l ∈ {−n2 ,−
n
2
+1, ...,−1, 0, 1, ..., n
2
−1, n
2
}.
We show next that xl,n → 0 as n→∞. That is, keeping l constant, the probability attached
to specific belief p̂(p0, l) converges to 0 as the number of experiments n becomes arbitrarily
large. To see why, note that:
xl,n+2
xl,n
= σ
(n+ 2)(n+ 1)
(n
2
+ 1 + l)(n
2
+ 1− l)
.
This implies that
xl,n+2
xl,n
→ 4σ < 1 as n → ∞. Therefore there exists K < 1 such that
xl,n+2
xl,n
≤ K < 1 if n is large enough. This implies that xl,n → 0 as n→∞.
Next, consider p̂ as a function of l. We see that p̂ is increasing in l and that p̂(p0, l)→ 0
when l → −∞ and that p̂(p0, l) → 1 when l → +∞. Take ε > 0. This implies that there
exist two threshold values l1 and l2 such that:
p̂(p0, l) ∈ [ε, 1− ε]⇔ l1 ≤ l ≤ l2.
Importantly, these values l1 and l2 do not depend on n. Take η > 0. Since for any l,
xl,n → 0 as n→∞, there exists n̄ such that n ≥ n̄⇒
∑l2
l=l1
xl,n ≤ η. This sum is precisely
equal to the probability that belief will end up lying within [ε, 1 − ε]. We showed that
∀ε, η > 0,∃n̄ : n ≥ n̄ ⇒ Pr(p(p0, k, n) ∈ [ε, 1− ε]) ≤ η. Since E(p̃) = p0, p̃ must converge
in probability to p∞. The proof for n odd runs along similar lines. QED.
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Next, compute the derivatives of q(p,m):
∂q
∂p
=
αm
[p+ (1− p)αm]2
∂2q
∂p2
=
−2αm(1− αm)
[p+ (1− p)αm]3
∂q
∂m
= −p(1− p) ln(α) α
m
[p+ (1− p)αm]2
∂2q
∂m2
= −p(1− p)[ln(α)]2αm p− (1− p)α
m
[p+ (1− p)αm]3
QED.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first obtain some useful formulas. By taking the derivative of
(1), we get:
∂e
∂q
=
−b(d0 + de0)
(b+ qd)2
.
Then, observe that
q
1− q
=
p
1− p
α−m.
Taking logs and differentiating with respect to m yields
∂q
∂m
= − ln(α)q(1− q).
Differentiating again and substituting yields
∂2q
∂m2
= − ln2(α)q(1− q)(2q − 1).
We first consider payoff under command and control. We compute the first derivative
of πc with respect to m:
∂πc
∂m
= b(e0 − e(q))
∂e
∂q
∂q
∂m
− c
⇔ ∂πc
∂m
= ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)
2 q
2(1− q)
(b+ qd)3
− c.
Differentiating again and simplifying yields
∂2πc
∂m2
= − ln2(α)b2(d0 + de0)2
q2(1− q)
(b+ qd)4
[2b− (3b+ d)q].
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(1) Suppose first that p < 2b
3b+d
. Since q ≤ p, ∂2πc
∂m2
< 0 and πc is concave. Since
∂πc
∂m
(∞) = −c,
either ∂πc
∂m
(0) ≤ 0 and the optimal effort is 0 or ∂πc
∂m
(0) > 0 and the optimal effort is the
unique m∗c > 0 satisfying
∂πc
∂m
(m∗c) = 0. We have:
∂πc
∂m
(0) = ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)
2p
2(1− p)
(b+ pd)3
− c.
To understand how ∂πc
∂m
(0) varies with p, study the function f(p) = p
2(1−p)
(b+pd)3
. We have:
f ′(p) =
p[2b− (3b+ d)p]
(b+ pd)4
.
This implies that f ′ > 0 if p ∈]0, 2b
3b+d
[ and < 0 if p ∈] 2b
3b+d
, 1[. Therefore, f(0) = f(1) = 0
and f is increasing over [0, 2b
3b+d
], decreasing over [ 2b
3b+d
, 1] and reaches its maximum at 2b
3b+d
.
Moreover, f( 2b
3b+d
) = 4
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1
b(b+d)2
. Two subcases appear:
(1.1) If c ≥ c̄c = 427 ln(α)
b(d0+de0)2
(b+d)2
, then ∂πc
∂m
(0) ≤ 0 and m∗c = 0.
(1.2) If c < c̄c, then there is a unique q
∗
c ∈ [0, 2b3b+d ] such that
∂πc
∂m
(m) = 0. It satisfies:
q∗2c (1− q∗c )
(b+ qd)3
=
c
ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)2
Optimal communication is then such that q = q∗c which implies that
m∗c =
1
ln(α)
[ln(
p
1− p
)− ln( q
∗
c
1− q∗c
)]
(2) Suppose, next, that p > 2b
3b+d
. Then πc is a convex function of m for q >
2b
3b+d
and
a concave function for q ≤ 2b
3b+d
. The marginal impact of an incremental unit of effort is
increasing for q > 2b
3b+d
and then decreasing when q < 2b
3b+d
. In particular, the optimal
effort is such that q ≤ 2b
3b+d
. We can see that the optimal effort is either 0 or m̂c the unique
m such that ∂πc
∂m
(m̂c) = 0 and q ≤ 2b3b+d . Compare the payoffs of these two effort levels:
ϕ(p) = πc(0)− πc(m̂c) = B(e(p))−B(e(q∗c )) +
c
ln(α)
[ln(
p
1− p
)− ln( q
∗
c
1− q∗c
)]
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Study how ϕ varies with p. We have:
∂ϕ
∂p
= −b
2(d0 + de0)
2
(b+ pd)3
p+
c
ln(α)
(
1
p
+
1
1− p
)
⇔ ∂ϕ
∂p
=
b2(d0 + de0)
2
p(1− p)
[f(q∗c )− f(p)].
Note that there is a unique q̄c >
2b
3b+d
such that f(q̄c) = f(q
∗
c ). From the derivative of
function f , we know that ∂ϕ
∂p
is > 0 over ]0, q∗c [, < 0 over ]q
∗
c , q̄c[ and > 0 over ]q̄c, 1[.
Therefore, ϕ is increasing over [0, q∗c ], decreasing over [q
∗
c , q̄c] and increasing over [q̄c, 1].
Since ϕ(q∗c ) = 0 and ϕ(1) = +∞, there is a unique level p∗c > q̄c > 2b3b+d such that ϕ(p
∗
c) = 0
and p < p∗c ⇒ πc(0) < πc(m̂c) and p > p∗c ⇒ πc(0) > πc(m̂c).
Next, consider payoff under a tax on emissions. We have:
∂πt
∂m
= be(q)
∂e
∂q
∂q
∂m
− c
⇔ ∂πt
∂m
= ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)
q(1− q)(be0 − qd0)
(b+ qd)3
− c.
Next, note that
∂
∂q
[
q(1− q)(be0 − qd0)
(b+ qd)3
]
=
h(q)
(b+ qd)4
with h(q) = b2e0 − 2b(d0 + e0(b+ d))q + (d0(3b+ d) + dbe0)q2. This implies that
∂2πt
∂m2
= − ln2(α)b2(d0 + de0)
q(1− q)h(q)
(b+ qd)4
.
Then, h(0) = b2e0 > 0 while h(1) = (b + d)(d0 − be0) < 0. Since h is quadratic, there
exists p̄t ∈]0, 1[ such that h(p̄t) = 0 and h(q) > 0 if 0 ≤ q < p̄t and h(q) < 0 if p̄t < q ≤ 1.
Therefore, ∂
2πt
∂m2
< 0 if q ∈]0, p̄t[ and ∂
2πt
∂m2
> 0 if q ∈]p̄t, 1[. As under command and control,
there are two cases.
(1) Suppose that p < p̄t. Then πt is concave. Note that
∂πt
∂m
(∞) = −c and
∂πt
∂m
(0) = ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)
p(1− p)(be0 − pd0)
(b+ pd)3
− c,
∂2πt
∂m∂p
(0) = ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)
h(p)
(b+ pd)4
.
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Therefore, ∂πt
∂m
(0) is increasing over [0, p̄t] and decreasing over [p̄t, 1], and
∂πt
∂m
(0) is maximum
for p = p̄t. Introduce
c̄t = ln(α)b
2(d0 + de0)
p̄t(1− p̄t)(be0 − p̄td0)
(b+ p̄td)3
.
Then if c ≥ c̄t, ∂πt∂m (0) ≤ 0 and m
∗
t = 0. By contrast, if c < c̄t, then define q
∗
t < p̄t such that
ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)
q∗t (1− q∗t )(be0 − q∗t d0)
(b+ q∗t d)
3
= c.
If p ≤ q∗t , then ∂πt∂m (0) ≤ 0 and m
∗
t = 0 while if p > q
∗
t , then m
∗
t is such that q(m
∗
t , p) = q
∗
t .
(2) Suppose that p > p̄t. Then πt is a convex function of m for q > p̄t and a concave
function for q ≤ p̄t. Therefore the optimal effort is either 0 or m̂t such that q(m̂t, p) = q∗t .
Compare payoffs:
ψ(p) = πt(0)− πt(m̂t) =
1
2
be(p)2 − 1
2
be(q∗t )
2 +
c
ln(α)
[ln(
p
1− p
)− ln( q
∗
t
1− q∗t
)]
with derivative
∂ψ
∂p
= b
∂e
∂p
e(p) +
c
ln(α)
(
1
p
+
1
1− p
)
⇔ ∂ψ
∂p
= −b2(d0 + de0)
(be0 − pd0)
(b+ pd)3
+
c
ln(α)
1
p(1− p)
.
Introduce g(p) = p(1−p)(be0−pd0)
(b+pd)3
. Note that by definition of q∗t , g(q
∗
t ) = c/[ln(α)b
2(d0 +de0)].
This yields
∂ψ
∂p
=
b2(d0 + de0)
p(1− p)
[g(q∗t )− g(p)].
Since ∂g/∂p = h(p)/[(b + pd)4], g is increasing over [0, p̄t] and decreasing over [p̄t, 1].
Therefore, there is a unique q̄t > p̄t such that g(q̄t) = g(q
∗
t ) and ψ is increasing over [0, q
∗
t ],
decreasing over [q∗t , q̄t] and increasing over [q̄t, 1]. Since ψ(q
∗
t ) = 0 and ψ(1) = +∞, then
there exists a unique p∗t > q
∗
t such that ψ(p
∗
t ) = 0. Then p < p
∗
t ⇒ πt(0) < πt(m̂t) and
p > p∗t ⇒ πt(0) > πt(m̂t). QED.
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that we have: ∂πc
∂m
= ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)f̃(q)− c while
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∂πt
∂m
= ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)g(q)− c with f̃(q) = (d0+de0)q
2(1−q)
(b+qd)3
and g(q) = q(1−q)(be0−qd0)
(b+qd)3
. Then,
g(q)
f̃(q)
=
be0 − qd0
(d0 + de0)q
≥ be0 − d0
d0 + de0
where the inequality comes from the fact that g(q)/f̃(q) is decreasing with q. Therefore if
be0 − d0 ≥ d0 + de0, g(q) > f̃(q) for any q ∈ [0, 1[ and hence
∂πt
∂m
(m) >
∂πc
∂m
(m)
and the marginal impact of effort on payoff is always greater under a tax on emissions than
under command and control. Integrate this inequality over [0,m]:
πt(m)− πt(0) > πc(m)− πc(0).
Therefore if 0 is the optimal choice under a tax on emissions, it must also be the optimal
choice under command and control. This implies that c̄c < c̄t and, if c < min(c̄c, c̄t),
q∗t < q
∗
c < p
∗
c < p
∗
t . Moreover, m
∗
t is equal to the highest m such that
∂πt
∂m
(m) = 0 and
∂πt
∂m
is decreasing above m∗t , and similarly for
∂πc
∂m
. The inequality ∂πt
∂m
> ∂πc
∂m
implies that
this last crossing must happen at a larger value for πt than for πc. Therefore if m
∗
t > 0,
then m∗t > m
∗
c . QED.
Comparative statics. From the characterization of q∗c , we can write:
q∗c (c) = f
−1
(
c
ln(α)b2(d0 + de0)2
)
where f−1 is the inverse of f over the range [0, 2b
3b+d
]. Since f is increasing in that range,
f−1 is also increasing. Since f only depends on d and b, this shows that q∗c is increasing in
c and decreasing in α, d0 and e0.
To study the comparative statics of p∗c , introduce λ(p, c) = B(e(p)) +
c
ln(α)
ln( p
1−p) such
that ϕ(p, c) = λ(p, c)− λ(q∗c (c), c). Consider c1 < c2. Then
λ(p, c2)− λ(p, c1) =
c2 − c1
ln(α)
ln(
p
1− p
)
and this function is increasing in p. Since q∗c is increasing in c, we have:
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q∗c (c2) > q
∗
c (c1). Moreover, q
∗
c (c2) <
2b
3b+d
hence lies in the range where λ(., c) is decreasing.
Since p∗c(c2) > q
∗
c (c2), λ(p
∗
c(c2), c2)−λ(p∗c(c2), c1) > λ(q∗c (c2), c2)−λ(q∗c (c2), c1). This means
that λ(p∗c(c2), c2)− λ(q∗c (c2), c2) > λ(p∗c(c2), c1)− λ(q∗c (c2), c1). Since
λ(p∗c(c2), c2)− λ(q∗c (c2), c2) = ϕ(p∗c(c2), c2) = 0 and λ(q∗c (c1), c1) > λ(q∗c (c2), c1), we have
λ(p∗c(c2), c1)− λ(q∗c (c1), c1) = ϕ(p∗c(c2), c1) < 0
and hence p∗c(c2) < p
∗
c(c1). Finally, note that an increase in α has the same impact as a
decrease in c. QED.
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